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Autonomy in Legal Ethics Scholarship
Camille A. Gear
It might be said that anyone whose conscience is so tender that he
cannot fulfill the prescribed obligations of a[n attorney] ... should
not undertake those obligations. He should not allow his moral
scruples to operate as a trap for those who are told by the law that
they may expect something more.
-Charles Fried'
Ethics scholars know that when attorneys use their moral concerns to guide
the representation of clients, attorneys can seriously undermine clients'
autonomy. Scholars' concerns, however, are mitigated by their belief that
lawyers must prevent clients from pursuing immoral goals. As a result, ethics
scholarship contains two contrary directives. Lawyers are told that they must
work to facilitate client autonomy2 and that they must use their power to
prevent clients from pursuing immoral goals.' These contrary assumptions
create tension in the ethics literature: Lawyers are unsure where their power
ends and where client autonomy begins. Ethics treatises resolve this tension by
1. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer Clhent Relation, 85
YALE U. 1060, 1065 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Arguing the Law in an Adversary System. 16 GA. L REv. 833. 835
(1982) (maintaining that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires attorneys to engage in zealous
advocacy and therefore to help clients act autonomously under the law); Fried. supra note I. at 1073
(arguing that the Constitution requires that we allow clients to exercise their autonomy under the law)
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics. 100 YALE L. 1239 (1991) (arguing that the lawyer's
historic role was to advance client autonomy); see also Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern Postmodern
Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291 (1985) (using philosophy to explain the importance of
personal autonomy).
3. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in
Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1981. 2022 (1993) (arguing that lawyers
have an obligation to engage in an independent determination of whether a client's goals art moral); Fred
C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 Wm. & MARY L REv 1303, 1321
(1995) (same).
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instructing the attorney to limit a client's autonomy when the client's morality
is alien to the attorney's chosen moral code. This general rule creates
predictable consequences. The three prevailing ethics models-the lawyer-as-
statesman,4 the lawyer-as-friend, 5 and the lawyer-as-hired-gun6---encourage
attorneys to subordinate their clients' interests and allow attorneys to use their
moral frameworks in their representation of clients.7
I first noted the inconsistency in the traditional ethics models' underlying
premises when I used the models to inform my representation of Ama Scott,
a client in the Advocacy for Parents and Children Clinic at the Yale Law
School.8 Ms. Scott is a thirty-five-year-old black woman who is HIV-positive,
homeless, a substance abuser, and a domestic violence survivor. According to
her file, Ms. Scott needed legal assistance in getting custody of her son
Hayden, a three-year-old HIV-positive child. The State of Connecticut had
taken custody of Hayden because Ms. Scott had failed to comply with her
Department of Children and Families (DCF) treatment plan.9 Specifically, Ms.
Scott had missed several of Hayden's medical appointments, had not found
stable housing, and had not finished a substance abuse treatment program.
After my first meeting with Ms. Scott, my moral sensibilities rumbled, a
cacophony of incoherent concerns.'0 Ms. Scott seemed to be in violation of
4. The term "lawyer-as-statesman" as used in this discussion primarily refers to William Simon's
ethical discretion model. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083
(1988). Under this model, the lawyer only pursues a client's goals if she advances the legal system's view
of justice. The model is based secondarily on Anthony Kronman's lawyer-statesman ideal, which embodies
a softer version of ethical discretion. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: THE FAILING IDEALS
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 144-45 (1993). The lawyer-statesman attorney privileges his clients' interests
but reserves the option to refuse to help the client pursue goals that conflict with the legal system's view
of justice. Kronman notes the inherent problems with suggesting that the lawyer intervene in this manner,
but argues that "a courageous lawyer is prepared to take risks for what he or she believes is fight-to risk
anger, contempt and a lower income-for the sake of the law's own good." Id. at 145.
5. The lawyer-as-friend pursues only causes that advance the ideals of her moral code. See Fried, supra
note 1, at 1083-84. Fried argues that the lawyer may not import her entire moral code into the
representation, but he leaves it to the individual attorney to identify which of her moral values to use in
the representation.
6. The lawyer-as-hired-gun advances a client's cause if her representation will allow the client to
exercise her fights freely, in the way the Constitution intended. See Freedman, supra note 2, at 837.
7. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 4; Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation of
Justification, 74 TEx. L. REv. 111 (1995); David Luban, The Lysistrian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen
Pepper, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637.
8. Although my clinic supervisor gave me permission to use this client's story, I am still troubled by
my decision to use her case to unravel my moral concerns. My hope is that her story will help attorneys
learn how to enable their clients to claim their fight to autonomy. In order to mask the identity of this client
in the sketch that follows, the names of all involved parties have been changed. The sketch is a composite
based on several meetings I had with my client over a six-month period.
9. For a description of another state's process for developing a parent treatment plan, see Marcia
Sprague & Mark Hardin, Coordination of Juvenile and Criminal Court Child Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings, 25 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 239, 242 (1996-1997).
10. Several of the texts that describe the traditional ethics models are abstract theoretical discussions;
this Note, in contrast, instrumentalizes principles in these discussions. Scholars disagree about whether
philosophy is the best means of explaining the nature of legal ethics. Compare Roger C. Cramton & Susan
P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145,
160-61 (1996) (arguing that philosophical ethics discussions usually are not well suited to addressing
concrete lawyer problems), and Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 9,
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her treatment plan. She appeared to be very ill and physically exhausted. She
also acted erratically, behavior that I knew in the past had triggered her DCF
worker to suspect that she was using drugs." Ms. Scott's words confirmed
my worries. She explained that she had not contacted the clinic for six months
because she had been in and out of the hospital recovering from various
illnesses and from Hayden's father's assaults.'2 Ms. Scott had not found
permanent housing and had no permanent address or phone number. I informed
Ms. Scott that Hayden's foster mother, a nurse who cared for HIV-positive
children, wanted to adopt him. Ms. Scott immediately rejected this idea; she
passionately wanted to be reunited with her son. Ms. Scott seemed surprised
when I mentioned that, according to DCF records, she had not visited Hayden
in the past three months.
3
After our meeting, I asked myself whether an ethical attorney would help
Ms. Scott pursue her wishes.'" My instincts suggested that I should focus on
facilitating Ms. Scott's autonomy. I had joined the clinic because I was
committed to helping poor people use the law to talk about the injustices in
their lives. I knew that there were substantial obstacles to achieving my goal.
The lawyer's superior knowledge of the law and her facility with legal
language allow her to flout a client's wishes surreptitiously when she dislikes
a client's goals. I also knew trust would be a problem. My perception of my
client would be filtered through my own preconceptions and biases; sensing
this, the client might not be truthful about her interests.' 5 I recognized that
my knowledge of the client would always be partial and limited. Still, I
believed there must be a way to free the client to articulate and act on her
desires.
Since my own concerns generated only doubt, I turned to the three
prevailing ethics models' 6 to determine whether and how I should represent
10-14 (1995) (same), with KRONMAN, supra note 4. at 6 (arguing that philosophy can be helpful in
discussions of lawyer ethics), and Fried, supra note I, at 1061 (same).
11. Ms. Scott's DCF worker often accused Ms. Scott of drug use without any hard proof.
12. Ms. Scott's long absences may have resulted from mental illness. Cf. John Peutla. Ethics. Money
and the Problem of Managed Behavioral Health Care, 40 ST. Louts U. L.J. 359, 394-95 (1992) (explaning
that persons who are mentally ill and abuse substances periodically disappear and exhibtt low trust).
13. Subsequently, I learned that the DCF records were inaccurate: Ms. Scott had visited her son twice
during the three-month period and had shown up at DCF offices on unscheduled days.
14. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide some guidance on ethtcal conduct. An attorney.
however, may exercise additional discretion to control a client when it is appropriate. See MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. I (1995) ("[A lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage
that might be realized for a client.").
15. Cf Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in
Lawyer/Client Interaction, in THE LAW AND SOCIETY READER 403. 405 (Richard Abel ed.. 1995) (arguing
that clients may speak in a different language of motive than the attorney in order to "resist the exercise
of professional power").
16. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text; see also Freedman, supra note 7. at 114 (assigning
professional ethics models different names); Jack L. Sammons, Rank Strangers to Me: Shaffer and
Cochran's Friendship Model of Moral Counseling in rite Law Office. 18 U. ARK. LrrrTtE ROCK L. I
(1995) (same).
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Ms. Scott. The models provided answers, but they all cast Ms. Scott in the role
of moral suspect. The lawyer-as-statesman model required me to assess
whether Ms. Scott's case represented the cause of justice, as proscribed by the
law.'7 If not, I could deny Ms. Scott representation. The lawyer-as-friend
model directed me to determine whether Ms. Scott's moral views were
consonant with my own; if not, I could decline to represent her. The classical
lawyer-as-hired-gun model directed me to refrain from morally judging Ms.
Scott. To ensure that I did not, I could never engage in moral dialogue with
her. If Ms. Scott proved to be so morally abhorrent that I ended up judging
her, my moral concerns would control and I could drop her case.'8
Although the various ethics models offered me clear direction, I was
troubled that they all forced me into a conflict with my client.'9 The models
required that I identify what the bounds of morality were and that I use my
conclusions to determine whether my client should be allowed to act
autonomously. In the end, if my client could not articulate a moral vision with
which I was familiar, the ethics models allowed me to deny her representation.
I longed for an ethics paradigm that would allow me to help the client explain
and expand her own independently constituted moral perspective.2" This
approach seemed more consistent with the philosophical account of autonomy
with which I was familiar: True autonomy means giving a person the
opportunity to engage in independent moral judgment.2'
This Note attacks the assumption in the ethics literature that the attorney-
client relationship must be a battle of moral visions. It challenges the idea that
the attorney has a right to act as the moral decisionmaker in a client's case.
Part I defines the key concepts of autonomy, ideology, and hegemony. Part I
then identifies the "ideology of domination"-four constructs in the ethics
literature that frame the attorney's perception so that she is predisposed to see
conflict between her and her client's goals and predisposed to prevent the
client from acting on the client's perceived alien morality. Part I argues that
17. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 15 (describing the lawyer-statesman model); Simon, supra note
4, at 1090 (describing the ethical discretion model); see also infra Section II.A (presenting the lawyer-as-
statesman model).
18. This is the classical definition of the hired-gun model. The contemporary version, as modified by
Monroe Freedman, is discussed later in more detail. See infra Section II.C. This contemporary version
allows the attorney to choose a client based on the attorney's moral inclinations and allows the attorney
to sever her relationship with her client if she determines that the client is immoral.
19. Cf. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations To Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1239, 1239 (1993) (arguing that lawyers need identity-sustaining
justifications for why they have chosen to be lawyers and why they make work-related decisions).
20. Cf. Gerald P. Lpez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life ofa Rebellious
Collaboration, 77 GEo. LJ. 1603, 1613 (1989) (arguing that the practice of law is enriched by the
perspectives of poor and disempowered persons).
21. Ethics scholars have rejected the idea that clients are "infinitely ... more valuable than any
government ... and that rules of legal ethics should be derived from th[is] premise." Monroe H. Freedman,
The Professional Responsibility of the Law Professor: Three Neglected Questions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 275,
275-76 (1986) (arguing that this kind of Christianity-based lawyer ethics has not taken persuasive hold in
the community of ethics scholars).
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the ideology of domination has conditioned both traditional and oppositional
scholars to devalue client autonomy.' Part H of the Note surveys the
traditional ethics models to illustrate how the ideology-of-domination
constructs focus attorneys' attention on attorney-client conflict and encourage
attorneys to limit client autonomy. Part III shows how the ideology of
domination has limited oppositional scholars' ability to create new ethics
models that allow clients to act autonomously.2 Part IV outlines ways in
which scholars can transcend the ideology-of-domination constructs, describing
what I call the ethical mirror model. Part IV demonstrates that once we shift
our ideological approach, we can reconfigure the attorney-client relationship
in a way that facilitates clients' autonomous moral judgment.
I. DEFINITIONS: AUTONOMY, IDEOLOGY, AND HEGEMONY
A. Autonomy
Ethics scholars have numerous grounds for privileging client autonomy in
the attorney-client relationship. Some argue that the lawyer was originally
constituted to be an agent who allowed the client to function as an autonomous
legal actor.24 Others insist that the Constitution requires attorneys to facilitate
client autonomy. They argue that, logically, the constitutional provisions that
secure a person rights would have little meaning if the person did not have a
professional's assistance in exercising her rights. 5 Additionally, ethics
scholars argue that the adversary system was constituted to be an arena where
competing interests clash. The system cannot function effectively, they argue,
when clients are forced to rely on professionals who refuse to create legal
22. Oppositional scholars are scholars from Critical Legal Studies (CLS). Cnucal Race Theory (CRT).
and Feminist Legal Studies. See Eleanor Marie Brown. Note, The Tower of Babel: Bridging the Diwde
Between Critical Race Theory and "Mainstream " Civil Rights Scholarship. 105 YALE LJ. 513.516 (1995)
(describing the same group of scholars as "outsider" scholars). Since oppositional scholars have adopted
the ideology of domination, they assume that there is a moral conflict between the attorney and the client.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy. 84 CAL L REv.
61, 70-72 (1996) (arguing that true empathy will end attorney-client conflict); Peter Margulies, The Mother
with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civil Republican View of Difference and
Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 695 (1994) (arguing that better attention to conflicting
messages in clients' stories will end attorney-client conflict); Ogletree, supra note 19. at 1271-75 (arguing
that immersion in the client's experience will end attorney-client conflict).
23. Oppositional scholars are surprised to find that their "day to day habits," their "ways of seeing,
hearing, and responding to... clients, all too often have the ironic-indeed perverse-cffect of repressing
the capacities and aspirations of the very people and communities [they] seek to help." Lucie B. white.
Paradox, PieceWork, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 853. 853 (1992).
24. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 E.MORY
LJ. 467, 467 (1992); Anthony T. Kronman. The Fault in Legal Ethics, 100 DicK. L REv. 489.494 (1996)
(arguing that one of the oldest justifications for client autonomy comes from the philosophical doctrine of
contractarianism).
25. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 24, at 470. Scholars also point to the constitutional guarantees
providing for the assistance of counsel in certain cases as textual proof that the founders intended that
persons would be given a lawyer's help when seeking legal relief. See. e.g.. id.
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claims that give unadulterated expression to clients' views.26 Lastly, ethics
scholars note that the Model Code of Professional Responsibility directs
lawyers to engage in zealous advocacy,27 suggesting that lawyers aggressively
assist their clients in pursuing their clients' independently selected goals. 28
Despite the numerous reasons for valuing client autonomy, most ethics
scholars have begun to argue that client autonomy can be subordinated in favor
of other issues, such as social justice, 9 lawyers' responsibilities to third
parties, 30 and lawyers' interests in their own autonomy.3  Additionally,
scholars argue that because the prevailing ethics models do not successfully
facilitate client autonomy, we must consider whether client autonomy is an
unrealistic value.32 Scholars who have increased their focus on values that
undermine client autonomy fail to resolve two important issues. First, since we
have constitutional, historical, and philosophical bases for affirming client
autonomy, we should be slow to abandon the ideal, even if it is hard to
achieve. Second, these new species of anti-autonomy concerns allow lawyers
to mask their aggressive desires to control clients who make them
uncomfortable, by arguing that their conduct is justified by competing social
or philosophical concerns. Indeed, a lawyer invokes these competing concerns
only when she cannot identify with the client's desires. The growing number
and variety of justifications for limiting client autonomy suggest that ethics
scholars see the attorney-client relationship as a battle of wills and that
scholars know that a lawyer's decision to circumscribe the client's right to
engage in autonomous moral judgment is suspect and must be explained.
I will try to direct scholars back to a focus on client autonomy by offering
a more nuanced definition of the value. Joseph Kupfer, a moral philosopher,
offers a helpful two-part explanation of autonomy. Autonomy, he explains,
includes (1) the right to deliberate about moral judgments, and (2) the right to
26. See, e.g., Fried, supra note I, at 1073; Kronman, supra note 24, at 495 (noting that some believe
that the hired-gun or contractarian lawyer assumes that a clash of views will make the legal system
accurately reflect society's interests).
27. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (1981).
28. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 4, at 1086 (arguing that the libertarian hired-gun model of advocacy
that allows clients to act autonomously is suggested by the Model Rules).
29. See Tremblay, supra note 10, at 11-27 (cataloguing the major ethics scholars' arguments for
rejecting lawyering approaches that are solely devoted to client autonomy).
30. Cf Freedman, supra note 21, at 275 (claiming that because law professors are isolated from client
contact, they tend to privilege third parties' interests over the interests of clients).
31. Kronman explains that the attomey's special knowledge about the law qualifies her to act as an
autonomous agent who weighs whether clients should be allowed to pursue their goals. See KRONMAN,
supra note 4, at 122-23. Fried argues that the attomey's autonomy is what allows her to express her
individuality. See Fried, supra note I, at 1069.
32. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L.
REv. 213, 213 (1991) (arguing from a traditionalist's perspective that client autonomy is an unrealizable
goal); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2111 (1991) (arguing as a CLS scholar that scholars must contend with
the fact that lawyer translation of client interests inevitably silences clients in some manner); White, supra




act on those judgments.33 According to Kupfer, these two rights cannot be
separated, for autonomy in one sphere is meaningless without autonomy in the
other.M Kupfer notes that the precondition for autonomous action is
autonomous judgment, which involves "forming beliefs on the basis of
evidence, reasoning from similar cases, and anticipating contingencies as well
as estimating their likelihood. '35 Kupfer argues that these skills must be
taught. The ideology of domination that I will describe encourages attorneys
to deprive clients of the right to engage in autonomous moral judgment and
therefore denies clients true autonomy. The ideology also encourages attorneys
to deny clients the assistance they may need to develop their own moral
decisionmaking skills.
B. Ideology
Ethics scholars subordinate the value of client autonomy in their work
because they are locked in a limiting mode of ideological thought.
6
Ideological thought naturalizes certain ways of seeing the world.37 It
"disable[s]" the mind and offers a perspective so seductive that it prevents a
person from even "' imagin[ing] that life could be different and better."' 3
Ideology limits people's thoughts by limiting their language choices.39 The
ideological language used to refer to relationships and objects shapes one's
perception of the things to which the language refers.4t Scholars who use the
same language, therefore, will tend to imagine social phenomena in similar
ways.
Ideology powerfully shapes perception,4 allowing it to achieve a second,
related goal: the production of attractive identities. Ideological identities shape
people's perceptions of themselves and their needs by convincing them to use
33. See JOSEPH H. KUPFER, AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 10-14 (1990).
34. See id. at 18.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Cf. TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY 15 (1991) (explaining how ideology limits perception); STUART
HALL, CRmcAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES 26 (David Morley & Kuan-Hsing Chen eds., 1996)
(explaining how ideology enables people to make sense of their environments and social relationships).
37. See Milner S. Ball, The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique. 51 GEO. WASH. L REv. 309. 311
(1983) (book review) (citing Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theor.y, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 286, 287 (David Kairys ed., 1982)); see also HALL, supra note 36, at 26.
38. Ball, supra note 37, at 311 (quoting Gordon, supra note 37, at 287).
39. See HALL, supra note 36, at 26. This Note relies on Antonio Gramsc's definition of ideology.
which is used in most CLS scholars' and cultural studies scholars' work. Gramsci's explanation of
ideological functioning is superior to those of other scholars because he presumes that individuals have the
power to resist ideological messages and that they choose among competing ideological regimes. See id.
40. See EAGLETON, supra note 36, at 15; HALL, supra note 36, at 26.
41. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY at ix (1990)
(explaining that identity categories are "the effects of institutions, practices (and] discourses"); EAGLEToN,
supra note 36, at 1-2 (discussing ideology's role in creating subject positions and creating relationships
between the subject and social institutions).
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the ideology's language to describe their interests.42 Ideology, however, does
not wholly manufacture a person's interests. Rather,
ruling ideologies can actively shape the wants and desires of those
subjected to them; but... they... also engage significantly with the
wants and desires that people already have, catching up genuine hopes and
needs, reinflecting them in the [ideology's] own peculiar idiom, and
feeding them back to their subjects in ways which render these ideologies
plausible and attractive.4
Stated simply, an ideological identity translates a person's amorphous needs
into a set of cognizable desires and suggests practices that can be used to
achieve these desires."
Although different ideologies always compete in a society, some
ideological constructs become hegemonic.45 Hegemonic ideas are ideological
constructs that are so naturalized that they are reduced to natural impulses and
common sense, even though these ideas are actually instilled by a process of
cultural socialization.46 To prevent revolutionary action, persons whose social
power is premised on a particular ideology attempt to make the ideology
hegemonic. For when "elites can shape the consciousness of would be
insurgents," the insurgents' critiques still employ hegemonic ideas, and in this
way "sustain [prevailing] forms of inequality and domination. 47
C. The Ideology of Domination Defined: The Four Constructs
The preceding insights about ideology suggest that the ethics literature
serves as an ideology that defines the scope and substance of lawyering. All
the ethics models describe the attorney-client relationship similarly. For
example, all suggest that the attorney is the correct person to dictate morality
within the attorney-client relationship. Additionally, all suggest that it is proper
for the attorney to express her moral and political predispositions in the
selection of clients. Relatedly, all suggest that the attorney's clientele function
42. See EAGLEON, supra note 36, at 14-15.
43. Id.
44. Cf JUDrI Bur'LR, BODi~s THAT MATrER at x-xi (1993) (explaining that one can analyze
ideologies for identity-performance practices other than practices used to enact gender identity).
45. See HALL, supra note 36, at 30 (describing the Althusserian idea of how "ideology becomes
internalized, how we come to speak spontaneously within the limits of categories of thought").
46. See id. at 27 (summarizing Gramsci's insights and describing how some ideology evolves into
"language of practical thought which stabilizes a particular form of power and domination; or which
reconcile and accommodate the mass of the people to [a] subordinate position").
47. James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 951 (1997). Pope, a CLS
scholar, invites us to imagine a world dominated by hegemonic thought: "In this [world], A might exercise
power over B not only by excluding her grievances from the public agenda, but also by preventing her
from recognizing them as remediable problems, or even by convincing her that she is not the kind of
person who is capable of defining and acting on grievances." Id. at 950.
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as a reflection of the attorney's identity. Lastly, all allow the attorney to sever
the attorney-client relationship when the attorney concludes that the client is
an immoral or amoral actor. This phenomena of shared perception is one of the
definitive signs that an ideology is at work. Under a Gramscian model of
ideology, one knows that "ideology [has] become[] internalized ... [when
persons] come to speak spontaneously within limited categories of thought. " 8
Ethics scholars' shared perceptions of clients are the inevitable result of their
use of a common set of linguistic constructs to discuss the attorney-client
relationship. The following discussion outlines the ideology of domination, a
group of shared linguistic constructs, to show how the ideology unifies ethics
scholars in a limited and autonomy-compromising view of clients.
The ideology of domination is made up of four constructs: (1) the
assumption that the attorney experiences "a discretionary moment"; (2) the
description of the "client as a threat" to the attorney's professional identity; (3)
the description of the attorney as a "system protector"; and (4) "the call to
ideological fidelity"-the assumption that the attorney must operate
consistently under a single ethics model. Collectively, these constructs ensure
that the attorney develops an aggressive posture in the representation, one
conducive to moral judgment or prone to emotional distance. 49 Because these
constructs permeate the dominant ethics models, an attorney who wants to
avoid dominating clients cannot find a principled theoretical approach to guide
her representation.50 I will now describe the four ideology-of-domination
constructs to make it easier to identify their use in each of the three prevailing
ethics models.
The first construct, the discretionary moment, occurs when the attorney
confronts the client's demands and decides whether her client's moral goals are
reconcilable with her own moral code 5' or the legal system's moral
commands. 52 The discretionary-moment construct precipitates attorney-client
conflict because it naturalizes the idea that the attorney should think about and
act on her own world view instead of focusing on her clients' articulated
interests.53 The construct prevents the attorney from imagining an attorney-
client relationship that prohibits the attorney from factoring her chosen moral
frame into her clients' decisions. In addition, the discretionary-moment
construct encourages attorney paternalism because it makes the lawyer believe
that her discretionary power to direct client ends makes her responsible for her
48. HALL, supra note 36, at 30.
49. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 97-98.
50. See Lpez, supra note 20, at 1607 (arguing that lawyers fighting against the dominant approaches
of lawyering resist practices "more through instinct than through self-conscious design").
51. See Fried, supra note 1, at 1065.
52. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 15.
53. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1995) ("In representing a client, a
lawyer... may refer not only to law but to ... moral, economic, social and political factors .... ).
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clients' goals.54 The construct prevents the attorney from seeing herself as a
translator who frames her client's legal interests. Instead, the lawyer is made
to believe that she must actively shape her client's moral goals and deny the
client representation if the client refuses to submit.
The discretionary moment is intimately linked to the second construct in
the ethics literature: the perception of the client as a threat. The lawyer is
encouraged to believe that in adopting the client's interests she puts her own
moral identity at risk. 5 The ethics literature focuses on scenarios in which
clients have unattractive moral goals, thus inaccurately characterizing the
attorney-client relationship as an inevitable moral tug of war.56 The client-as-
threat construct also freezes the attorney's imagination, preventing her from
seeing the lawyer-client relationship as a collaborative and client-directed
endeavor. Lawyers who expect their clients to be threats will be hostile to
clients' contrary moral views.57 They are unlikely to listen to clients' insights
about the legal system or complaints about the attorneys' moral views. Instead,
these attorneys' defensive postures make them react to their clients' moral
visions by thinking of ways to reframe clients' goals.
The third construct, the lawyer as system protector, naturalizes the
assumption that the attorney's function is to uphold the law.58 The construct
requires the attorney to express faith in the legal system's assessment of
justice.59 The system-protector construct 6 makes attorneys less likely to
believe that their clients have suffered injuries when their injuries cannot be
54. See, e.g., id. cmt. 2 ("It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations
in giving advice.").
55. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 114 (arguing that lawyers fear that they are required to
forfeit their consciences when they represent clients). CRT scholar David Wilkins also notes that the
lawyer's moral identity is tied to client representation. He argues that the lawyer has a right to find moral
satisfaction in her work and this right brings a responsibility for client goals. See Wilkins, supra note 3,
at 1985. Note that, because Wilkins sees the lawyer's selection of clients and the lawyer's suggestion of
client means and ends as part of the lawyer's identity, he also makes the lawyer responsible for her clients'
resulting actions.
56. Scholars have noted that, in reality, lawyers tend to gravitate toward clients with interests similar
to their own. See Wilkins, supra note 3, at 2022; Zacharias, supra note 3, at 1303.
57. Cf Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATli. U. L. REV. 331, 334-36
(1987) (noting that a lawyer is likely to be resistant to a client's efforts to pursue a moral course of action
that the lawyer perceives as alien, and the lawyer is unlikely to change her own moral view).
58. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 138 (arguing that the lawyer's goal is to help a client while
advancing the law's well-being); see also Fried, supra note 1, at 1081 (arguing that when the lawyer
advocates for a client in ways that shape the law, the "lawyer's conduct ... travels outside the bounds of
legal friendship and becomes political friendship, political agitation, or friendship tout court").
59. See Fried, supra note 1, at 1081 (noting that zealous advocacy does not require the belief that the
legal system fails to protect clients' rights adequately).
60. The system-protector construct is relatively weak, and may not describe the lawyer's experience
with perfect accuracy. For example, civil rights lawyers, public defenders, and corporate lawyers regularly
flout the substantive law by stretching legal rules and procedural protections to help their clients. See
William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 217, 228-39 (1996)
(cataloguing examples of heroic lawyers in literature, legal studies, and popular culture who do not adhere
to the system-protector construct).
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resolved by the established law.6' Additionally, the construct makes attorneys
less likely to value clients' pain when this pain is invisible under traditional
legal and moral discourse.62
The fourth hegemonic construct in the ethics literature is the call to
ideological fidelity. This construct makes each of the ethics models seem as
though it is a hermetically sealed world view. The attorney is directed to filter
all client information and to base all client decisions on her chosen ethics
model, in order to protect the integrity of the attorney's personal moral code.
The call to ideological fidelity is dangerous because it makes the attorney less
attentive to information that challenges her chosen ethics model. 63 Once an
ideology is adopted, it is constitutive and constituting: A person tends to notice
only information that confirms the ideology.' The call to ideological fidelity
also aggravates the attorney's aggressive relationship with her client. The
ethics literature makes the attorney focus on faithfully enacting her chosen
ethics model under the threat that if she deviates she will suffer an identity
crisis. The lawyer therefore is hostile to the client's articulation of an alien
ethics code because the client's ethics code both distracts the attorney from her
personal identity project and poses a challenge to her world view.6
Judith Butler's identity-performance theory provides a theoretical basis
for this claim. 66 Butler explains that an individual's identity-maintenance
61. This construct has a disproportionate effect on marginalized communities. Cf. David B. Wilkins.
Practical Wisdom for Practicing Lawyers: Separating Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV L.
REV. 458, 469-70 (1994) (reviewing KRONMAN. supra note 4) (describing issues that suggest that
marginalized communities need lawyers who are not system protectors).
62. Roger Cramton and Susan Koniak argue that the system-protector construct performs two
functions: It minimizes lawyers' understanding of clients' pain. and it prevents clients from secunng the
means to change the law. Cramton and Koniak explain that because the system-protector lawyer
must proceed on the presumption that present conditions are not so tetrble. that currently
existing society is not so unjust, corrupt or violent. [she] begin[s] with a blindness to the pain
of those who have been or are now the victims of society's great wrongs [Therefore tlhe
pain of these [victims] cannot be so great because society is not so bad. or so the Isystem-
protector] must believe.
Cramton & Koniak, supra note 10, at 196. Cramton and Komak's observation also shows that lawyers from
marginalized communities are further marginalized by the ethics literature. For example, one wonders how
a Native American attorney could believe that the law promotes justice, given the wild vacillation in the
definition of Native Americans' rights over the past 100 years.
63. See Pope, supra note 47, at 950 (citing RAYMOND WILLIAMS. MARXISM AND LrI'tATtRE I ll
(1977)).
64. See id.
65. Only recently have legal scholars started to look at how legally constituted ideologies construct
people's identities. See, e.g., James Boyle, Is Subjectivitv Possible 7 The Postmodern Subject in Legal
Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 489, 504 (1991) (arguing that CLS has paid insufficient attention to the
concept of subject formation).
66. See BuTLER, supra note 44. at x-xi. Identity-performance theory can be used to analyze the ethics
literature because ethics scholars argue that lawyers should see professional identity as their pnmary
identity and that lawyers should use the ethics literature to define their identity perspectives, See. e.g..
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Dimensions of Ethical Responsibility: Relevant Others. 54 U_ Ptrr L REV, 965
(1993); see also Kenneth Anderson, A New Class of LawYers: The 7erapeutc as Rights Talk. 96 COLUt.
L. REV. 1062, 1069 (1996) (review essay) ("IlIncreasingly. the law has become the only personal identity
for its practitioners, lawyers are increasingly unable to define themselves in terms other than their
occupational and professional ones."). Anderson shows that ethics literature, commencement addresses., and
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drive67 requires the individual to do the following: (1) distinguish herself
from others;68 (2) search for paradigmatic examples of her chosen identity; 69
(3) develop identity-affuming practices; 7° and (4) engage in these practices
compulsively.7' With Butler's insights, one notes that the ethics literature has
the characteristics of an identity-maintenance medium. The literature is
preoccupied with determining what distinguishes lawyers from other
professionals.72 The discussions suggest that the professional ethics models
are paradigmatic examples of lawyer identity and provide real-life examples
of the personae. The literature distills the models into practices 73 and
encourages lawyers repetitively to engage in these practices.74 In addition, the
literature requires the attorney to choose one professional ethics model as her
ethics identity.
75
When the ethics literature is examined as an identity-performance medium,
the destructive potential of the call to ideological fidelity is revealed. Lawyers,
clinic classes suggest that professional identity is the lawyer's primary identity. Anderson also notes that
because modem lawyers spend more time at work than lawyers did in the past, they have tended to express
their personal and political commitments in their professional lives. See Anderson, supra, at 1069-72.
67. Butler's theory is easily extended to other areas of identity maintenance because it is based on a
theory that addresses identity-formation practices generally. See, e.g., J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS
wrr WORDS (1962) (describing how identities are structured through language); JOHN R. SEARLE. SPEECH
ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969) (elaborating on Austin's theory). Austin and
Searle theorize about the linguistic distinctions between words' power to perform things and words'
imprecise enactment of the speaker's intended performance. Butler has instrumentalized their ideas in her
work. See BUTLER, supra note 44, at x-xi.
68. See BUTLER, supra note 44, at ix-x; see also Jerry Frug, Decentralizing Decentralization, 60 U.
CHI. L. REv. 253, 306-07 (1993) (describing Butler's performativity theory).
69. See BUTLER, supra note 44, at x-xi. Butler's theory might be criticized for oversimplifying the
process by which persons select gender-identity-affirming practices because it is difficult to locate
uncontested articulations of gender in modem social discourse. In contrast, models of professional identity
are fairly static, and ethics treatments habitually refer to paradigmatic examples of professionalism.
Therefore, Butler's performativity theory has great explanatory power in discussions of professional
identity.
70. See id.
71. See id. Several legal scholars have discussed Butler's performativity analysis. See, e.g., Martha M.
Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U.
L. R v. 1107, 1166 (1996) (using a performativity model to analyze sexual orientation and gender identity);
Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 771 (1997) (same).
Scholars are also beginning to extend the model. See Judith Butler, Burning Acts: Injurious Speech, 3 U.
CHI. ROUNDTABLE 199, 199-204 (1996) (using performativity to analyze hate speech); Frug, supra note
68, at 262-63 (using performativity to explain how municipalities are treated as legal subjects). Thus far,
no scholar has used it to analyze lawyers' identity-maintenance strategies.
72. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 1, at 1063 (comparing a lawyer's duty of care to a doctor's duty of
care); Hazard, supra note 66, at 965 (arguing that ethical standards used in other professions can be used
to determine bases for lawyer ethics).
73. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 14-15 (describing practices that identify the lawyer-statesman);
Gerald P. lpez, An Aversion to Clients: Loving Humanity and Hating Human Beings, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 315, 322 (1996) (identifying practices that define a progressive lawyer).
74. Cf. KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 1-4 (arguing that deviation from the lawyer-statesman model has
made lawyers lose their identity); Freedman, supra note 57, at 336 (arguing that there is no acceptable
alternative to h model other than the contemporary hired-gun approach).
75. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 7 (urging lawyers to restore the lawyer-statesman model);
Lrpez, supra note 73, at 322 (drawing a more loosely defined, but exclusive model of progressive
lawyering).
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preoccupied with their desire to enact their own identities, may view clients'
articulation of contrary moral views to be interruptions of their own identity
projects. Lawyers' identity-maintenance drives will be aggressive, for identity
maintenance places special importance on forcing others to recognize one's
chosen identity.76 Therefore, when a client challenges her attorney's ethical
vision, the attorney may try to reshape the client's interests so that the client
can assume her proper role in the attorney's identity-performance project. In
this way, the call to ideological fidelity prevents attorneys from responding
properly to the different needs of their various clients.
Collectively, the ideology-of-domination constructs encourage the attorney
to control client autonomy. If the client is a threat, the attorney must contain
the client's influence. If the attorney is a system protector, she must
aggressively defend the legal system. The discretionary moment gives the
attorney the opportunity to limit client autonomy; she determines whether she
should deny the client her help and whether to reshape the client's goals. The
call to ideological fidelity ensures that attorneys do not have disparate
experiences that would inspire them to challenge each ethics model's
ideological approach. In addition, it encourages the attorney to bring her
aggressive identity-performance needs into the attorney-client relationship.
Admittedly, the term "client" describes a diverse group, ranging from poor,
middle-class, and wealthy individuals to public interest organizations, the state,
and corporations. While the ideology of domination affects all clients,
regardless of their wealth and social power, poor clients may feel its effects
most acutely because such clients are likely to present moral problems with
which the lawyer is unfamiliar. Because lawyers are predominately middle
class, and because their legal education socializes them to have an affinity with
the middle class, 77 they may feel alienated by poor clients' problems. In these
moments of alienation, the lawyer is likely to turn to the ethics models for
guidance. Since the ethics literature supports the notion that he attorney is
entitled and often obligated to use her moral code to control clients, poor
clients are put in a situation in which they must convince their attorneys that
their goals are consistent with their attorneys' chosen moral codes. If a client
is unconvincing, she may be denied representation. 8 Rather than advising the
76. See BUTm.ER, supra note 44, at 18-19. In the context of gender identity. Butler notes that a person
stops compulsively engaging in identity practices when she feels that she has marked her body so that she
is socially recognized as a given gender. See id.
77. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 155.
78. Given the attorney's superior power, a poor client knows that resistance is futile. The attorney's
specialized knowledge about the law allows the attorney to act so that the client may be unaware that her
interests are being thwarted. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDLcr Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1995) ("JAI
lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client."); id. (-A lawyer has
professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued."). Even if she learns
of her lawyer's betrayal, the client's lack of legal knowledge will make her ill-equipped to respond to it.
A poor client will often feel it is useless to change attorneys because she is aware that if she cannot
convince her current attorney of her morality, her next attorney may not believe her either. Finally, the
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attorney to use her power over poor clients judiciously, the traditional ethics
literature encourages her to flex her strength whenever her moral sensibilities
demand it.
The ideology of domination circumscribes wealthy individual clients and
corporate clients in a more subtle manner. Such clients enjoy a range of
effective resistance strategies, the most important being the power of exit.79
Indeed, these clients may choose their attorneys, and attorneys often feel as
though their livelihood depends on these clients' goodwill.80 The ideology-of-
domination scholarship constructs this phenomenon as a problem. In the event
of lawyer-client conflict, the ethics literature advises lawyers working with
relatively powerful clients to "be courageous, ' 8' to hold their ground, and to
convince the client that the attorney is the right person to serve as arbiter of
moral goals in the relationship. 2 Clients with cultural and financial capital
can often effectively control lawyers. Indeed, these clients usually have better
facility with language than do poor clients and come from the same moral
universe as the attorney. As a result, they are more successful in convincing
attorneys that their goals are ethically sound.
D. Overcoming Limiting Ideologies
Increasingly, there are signs that the ideology of domination has become
hegemonic. As previously explained, hegemonic ideas prevent scholars from
conceiving of new approaches to problems. Indeed, oppositional ethics scholars
have begun to argue that they cannot theorize models that avoid attorney
antagonism. Oppositional scholars complaining of this problem employ the
ideology-of-domination constructs in their work. Because these constructs
frame and limit perception, scholars using this language inevitably cast the
attorney-client relationship as an antagonistic one. As long as oppositional
scholars use these constructs, they will be unable to construct radical new ways
of seeing the attorney-client relationship.
Once we understand that the ethics literature functions as an ideology and
that it encodes hegemonic principles, we can better identify the work that is
before us. Although CLS scholars note that we can never fully escape
attorney has more power over the client because she enjoys almost limitless discretion to end the
relationship on moral grounds. See id. Rule 1.16(b) (stating that a lawyer may withdraw when her client's
objective is "repugnant or imprudent" or for "good cause").
79. See Fried, supra note 1, at 1065-66 (arguing that the client can wield the power of exit to show
her dissatisfaction with her lawyer).
80. Kronman worries that clients will not hire lawyers who attempt to limit them from pursuing
immoral ends. He calls for lawyers to be courageous and to reclaim their power. See KRONMAN, supra note
4, at 7. Simon makes the same argument. See Simon, supra note 4, at 1129.
81. KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 145.
82. See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 15, at 418 (arguing that lawyers handling personal matters often
tell clients to be suspicious of their own judgment because they are too emotional to make rational
decisions about legal strategy).
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ideology, they believe that we must "make maps of [ideological] value
systems" and show how ideological beliefs "guide and limit perception."1
3
These maps can be used to "liberate thought" by elucidating the "false
constraints of these belief systems: by showing the historical contingency of
belief-structures, empirically disproving claims of necessity, and exposing the
incoherence of various theories."84 Ideology maps can be used to show how
ideology "lends to contingent, value-laden decisions an air of neutrality,
inevitability, and rightness and ... allows decision makers to deny
responsibility for the suffering their judgments create.""
In addition to pointing out the limits of existing ideologies, ideological
maps allow one to create new ideologies that escape the old ideology's limiting
framework. Social theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe explain that
we can use ideology maps as markers and form oppositional ideologies by
testing our ideas against these maps to ensure they escape the debunked
ideological framework.8 6 Part II will follow Laclau and Mouffe's recipe for
revolutionary thought by drawing a map of the four ideological constructs that
I have called collectively the ideology of domination, and by highlighting the
problems that flow from the ideology's constructs. The ideology map will then
be used in Part III to survey oppositional scholars' successes and failures in
breaking free of the ideology. In Part IV, the map will be used to create an
alternative position in opposition to the ideology of domination: the ethical
mirror model.
II. THE THREE MODELS DEFINED
A. The Lawyer-as-Statesman Model
When Arna Scott asked me if I would take her case, I first assessed her
cause under the lawyer-as-statesman ethics model, which requires an attorney
to use her "practical wisdom '87 or "discretionary judgment"" to determine
whether the client's interests are consistent with the law and therefore worthy
of representation. 9 The lawyer-as-statesman model posits that the lawyer's
83. Ball, supra note 37, at 312 (summarizing Gordon. supra note 37, at 289).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 311.
86. See ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE. HEGF_.MONY & SOCIAUsIT STRATEGY. TOWARDS
RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLmcs 67, 186 (1985): see also White. supra note 23. at 856-59 (describing
strategies for avoiding ideology-based descriptions of clients): cf. HALL supra note 36. at 26 (arguing that
"[w]e need to understand [the] role [ideas play] in a particular social formation, so as to inform the struggle
to change society").
87. KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 2-4, 14-17.
88. Simon, supra note 4. at 1086; see also William H. Simon, The Etucs of Criminal Defense, 91
MICH. L. REv. 1703, 1703 (1993) (arguing that criminal defense lawyers should use an ethical discretion
approach to lawyering).
89. See Simon, supra note 4, at 1083.
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experiences with the legal system9° or her special training9' give her the
unique ability to sort through "competing legal ideals"'  and, therefore,
prepare her to advance the cause "that seem[s] most likely to promote
justice."93 Once an attorney chooses to represent a client, the attorney can use
only legal strategies that are consistent with the legal system's values.94 If the
client's interests become inconsistent with the law's purposes, the lawyer
teaches the client that the law enacts the correct moral code.95
The lawyer-as-statesman model suggested that I should decline to represent
Ms. Scott. Ms. Scott's interests were not consistent with the fundamental
values behind the legal rules. Because Ms. Scott had not complied with her
treatment plan and because she still represented a danger to Hayden, I would
not be pursuing the cause of justice by pushing for their reunion. Additionally,
because there were allegedly more deserving clients in the clinic who could
benefit from my services-parents who had complied with their treatment
plans, for example-I could decline to represent Ms. Scott with a clear
conscience.
I questioned, however, the lawyer-as-statesman model's assumption that
the client does not have the capacity to act as a responsible moral agent. The
model suggested that the attorney's role was to train the client to adopt the
legal system's values.96 Until the client becomes a disciplined moral subject,
the attorney has full responsibility for making moral judgments. Neither of
these tenets promoted client autonomy, since autonomous moral judgment
requires that the attorney and the client have critical distance from their own
perspectives.97
The lawyer-as-statesman model sabotages the client's right to act
autonomously because it employs the ideology-of-domination constructs. The
90. See iii
91. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 112-14, 118-19. Kronman believes the case method teaches the
qualities of sympathy, moral detachment, and moral imagination necessary to develop practical wisdom.
See id. at 112-14.
92. Simon, supra note 4, at 1084.
93. Id. at 1090.
94. See id. at 1084. Simon attempts to give the attorney some ability to deviate from the law's moral
code by framing the legal issue either in narrow or broad terms. See id. at 1107-13. He notes that a lawyer
may violate procedural rules if a fundamental legal right is at stake. The more a client's legal claim poses
a threat to fundamental values, "the more justified the lawyer is in treating the relevant norms formally."
Id. at 1103. Because, however, the attorney has the sole authority to decide when the client's fundamental
values are at stake, a client whose moral code seems alien is unlikely to convince her attorney to ignore
procedural rules.
95. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 129-32; Simon, supra note 4, at 1131; cf. Charles Fried, The
Artificial Reason of Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEx. L. REv. 35, 36-37 (1981) (questioning whether
we can assume that the law's moral commands actually reflect the optimal moral calculus).
96. Cf. KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 130-31 (describing the process as collaborative dialogue). Although
Kronman argues that the lawyer and the client must be open to changing their views, he notes that if the
attorney believes the client has not adopted a reasonable position, the attorney will have to make the
decision whether to help the client pervert the law. See id. at 131. Kronman's goal is to convince lawyers
that they can take an independent stand to protect the law in these instances.
97. See KUPFER, supra note 33, at 11.
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model's ample provisions for discretionary moments increase attorney
aggressiveness. The lawyer exercises discretion at intake and whenever she
believes her client has asked her to pervert the legal rules.9" William Simon
admits that these discretionary moments require the lawyer to weigh the
"relative merits of the client's goals and claims."" Indeed, the model directs
the lawyer to evaluate her clients' needs comparatively and to queue clients'
cases according to the cases' consistency with the proper operation of the legal
regime.'°° Clients with alien moral codes, or those who threaten to disrupt
the law's functioning, must be reeducated about morality or they will be
denied representation. The discretionary moments in the model remind the
lawyer that the client must submit to her moral assessments.
The client-as-threat construct also encourages the lawyer-as-statesman
attorney to act antagonistically toward her client. Anthony Kronman directs the
lawyer-as-statesman to deal with the threatening nature of clients by abstracting
clients' needs and treating them with emotional distance.'0 ' Simon similarly
suggests that the lawyer "confront and resolve the competing factors that bear
on the internal merits of the client's goals and claims."' '" Both Kronman and
Simon make the client's interest a single consideration in a multi-factor
assessment. 10 3 When the client's interest conflicts with the moral commands
of law, the client bows to the need to maintain moral order. The client's alien
moral view is preemptively contained because client wishes have relatively
little weight in the lawyer's final decision about whether to act.
The system-protector construct also induces the lawyer-as-statesman to be
combative. The construct is especially strong in this model because the lawyer-
as-statesman's stated purpose is to ensure the proper operation of the law.
Simon directs the lawyer to choose actions that "promote justice,""'
knowing that, because the lawyer-as-statesman cannot distort the law, justice
can mean only whatever justice the legal system currently provides. Kronman
similarly encourages attorneys to pursue interests that further the shared values
of the community.'0 5 He also argues that law represents the community's
98. See Simon, supra note 4, at 1083, 1092-93, 1104.
99. Id. at 1083.
100. See id. at 1091-92; see also KRONMAN, supra note 4. at 118 (explaining that when law students
are trained to adopt the perspective of judges, they learn to weigh the relative merits of the clients interests
against countervailing interests).
101. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 113-16 (discussing the case method's ability to teach a student
to suppress all sympathetic capabilities to experience the judge's perspective of scrupulous neutrality).
Kronman notes that law students initially fear that the process of empathizing with many people will cause
them to lose their souls. See id. at 114-115. He describes how the case method teaches them to engage in
disciplined empathy that allows them to treat people's interests with emotional distance. See id.
102. Simon, supra note 4, at 1091.
103. Kronman argues that the lawyer-as-statesman uses imagination to inhabit the mind of the client.
and of the judge, and then considers what result would benefit the rule of law in the abstract. See
KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 118-19; see also Simon, supra note 4. at 1090 (same). Simon also includes
considerations of internal merit and relative merit. See Simon. supra note 4. at 1090-95.
104. Simon, supra note 4. at 1090.
105. See KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 4.
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collaboratively derived values.' 6 The lawyer-as-statesman model creates a
scenario in which, unless the client can frame her interests in ways that support
the legal order, her attorney may feel obliged either to reshape the client's
interests so that they comport with legal order, or to refuse to represent her.
The last construct, the call to ideological fidelity, also makes the lawyer-
as-statesman hostile to the client's perspective. Kronman uses the construct
when he argues that lawyers' gravitation toward a hired-gun model has caused
them to have identity crises. 7 According to Kronman, the exercise of
practical wisdom, the distinctive mark of a lawyer-statesman, is the sole means
of claiming the lawyer's true identity.'0 8 Simon also proposes that lawyers
adopt only the lawyer-as-statesman model because in his description of the
model, he attacks and debunks the premises that inform the other ethics
models'0 9 In both scholars' work, the call to ideological fidelity ensures that
lawyers do not have disparate experiences that would cause them to challenge
the lawyer-as-statesman model."0 Additionally, the call encourages attorneys
to treat their clients' articulation of alternative moral codes as an opportunity
for the lawyers to act out their professional personae and to solidify their claim
to the lawyer-as-statesman identity.
B. The Lawyer-as-Friend Model
The lawyer-as-friend model, which required that I establish "concrete,
personal relations""' with my client, initially seemed to be a kinder, gentler
way to approach client representation than the lawyer-as-statesman model.
Under this model, I had to determine whether Ms. Scott's moral goals matched
my own and whether I could engage in moral dialogue with her."2 Once I
accepted her case, I was bound to advance her interests as zealously as the law
permitted." 3 Charles Fried, the creator of the model, argues that, ideally, "the
106. See id. at 138.
107. See id. at 122-23 (arguing that one cannot be a good lawyer without the lawyer-statesman's civic-
minded approach to analyzing legal issues and his ability to detach himself from partisan judgment); see
also id. at 3 (arguing that lawyers were happier with their careers when they believed they played the
lawyer-statesman role of developing civic ideals).
108. See id. at 16-17.
109. See Simon, supra note 4, at 1086-87.
110. Simon acknowledges that lawyers rarely adopt a single ethics model in unqualified form, but
notes that the models function as heuristics to guide the lawyer's conduct. See id. at 1087.
111. Fried, supra note 1, at 1070.
112. See id. at 1082-84. This discussion simplifies Fried's philosophical discussion of the attorney's
moral obligation to give life to the client's wishes. Fried first states that the client's interests are the
paramount concern. See id. at 1080-81. He later argues that unless the client's wishes and her desired
strategy are consistent with the attorney's personal moral code, the attorney is not obliged to do what the
client asks. See id. at 1083. Fried notes that this formulation may lead the attorney to dominate her client,
and he expresses concern that his model may allow a lawyer's "benevolent tyranny over and imposition
on his client." Id. at 1066 n.17. He decides, however, "not [to] touch" these problems. Id.
113. See id. at 1081.
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client's needs . . . hold the reins"" 4 in the relationship, but the "lawyer's
liberty-moral liberty" must also be respected." 5 Therefore, according to
Fried, the lawyer can end an attorney-client relationship when it is clear that
the client is morally reprehensible."
6
A review of my moral inclinations about Ms. Scott under the lawyer-as-
friend model left me torn. I was sensitive to the fact that Ms. Scott might be
a victim of systemic racism. My moral affinity with her, however, ended when
she revealed her attitudes with respect to her son Hayden. In my mind, a
parent ought to consider the objective best interests of a child."' Therefore,
I thought that Ms. Scott should consider that Hayden had the chance to escape
the foster care system and be taken into a seemingly ideal home. Ms. Scott's
refusal even to examine this possibility made me believe that we could not
form a moral dialogue together.
My review of how the lawyer-as-friend model directed one to respond
convinced me that any ethics model that required the attorney to factor her
own moral conceptions into the representation would undermine client
autonomy. When an attorney uses her own moral code to guide a client's case,
she is likely to feel personally attacked if the client challenges her moral
view. 8 In addition, given the lawyer's intimate connection to her own moral
project, she is unlikely to be able to unpack discontinuities in her moral
framework or to know when it is necessary to move beyond her own ethical
frame. The lawyer-as-friend model aggravated these problems because it made
my moral decisions determinative. If the client disagreed with my moral
assessments, I could deny the client assistance or end my representation of her.
In the lawyer-as-friend model, the ideology-of-domination constructs
seemed to increase the lawyer's domineering influence. The lawyer-as-friend
model is permeated with discretionary moments. The lawyer is entitled to
exercise discretion at intake and whenever the client's interests conflict with
the lawyer's moral code. Fried explains that the lawyer's power of discretion
is her means of expressing her identity. According to Fried, the attorney must
"first of all be dear to himself."'" 9 This is the "kernel of individuality [from
which] the other things we value radiate."' ° Because Fried links the
114. Id. at 1077.
115. Id. at 1078.
116. See id. at 1083-84. Fried issues a caveat: The lawyer may be required to offer representation to
a repugnant client if the client would otherwise be left unrepresented. See id. at 1074 n.27. Even this
obligation, however, is limited to situations in which the client has an essential fight at stake. See id. at
1086. Because the lawyer determines what an essential right is, a lawyer who is repulsed by her clients is
more likely to conclude that the client is not pursuing an essential interest.
117. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er AL. BEYOND ThE BEST INTEREsTS OF TiE CtiLD (1979)
(arguing that an attorney can make an objective assessment of the child's best interests).
118. Moreover, a lawyer's personal morality may simply reflect the goals of the elite. See Hazard.
supra note 2, at 1241, 1268.
119. Fried, supra note 1, at 1069. Fried often conflates attorneys' autonomy with their ability to judge
clients. See id at 1070.
120. Id. at 1069.
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attorney's power of discretion to her identity project, he makes it clear that the
attorney will read the client's attempt to challenge the lawyer's discretionary
power as an attack on the lawyer's identity.
The client-as-threat construct also leads to attorney aggression under the
lawyer-as-friend model. Fried explains that he created the model because he
was concerned about the burden of representing clients with moral codes that
were alien and threatening.12 To avoid this burden, Fried directs lawyers to
scrutinize clients' morality at intake.' 2 If a lawyer later finds she has formed
relations with a morally questionable client, she can try to change the client's
moral perspective. 23 In this way, Fried ensures that the lawyer treats moral
perspectives different from her own as threats. When Fried allows the lawyer
to end her representation if a morally distasteful client does not change her
mind,' 2A Fried ensures that the client threat can be vanquished.
The system-protector construct in the lawyer-as-friend model also
encourages attorney aggressiveness. Under the lawyer-as-friend model, the
lawyer is forced to redirect clients who have goals requiring substantive
changes in the law.' 5 Although the model allows a lawyer to exploit
procedural protections to forward a client's interests, this strategy still serves
majority interests. For the lawyer-as-friend is condemned to act as a safety
valve, directing clients to marginal legal strategies rather than ones that would
truly disrupt the law.
The lawyer-as-friend model requires ideological fidelity as well, sealing
a lawyer off from stimuli that would challenge the model. Fried rejects both
the lawyer-as-statesman's commitment to justice 26 and the hired gun's "first-
come-first-serve" approach to choosing clients. 27 He suggests that the
lawyer-as-friend model provides all the a priori rules a lawyer needs to
negotiate her interaction with clients. Fried's claim that the lawyer-as-friend
model requires strict adherence suggests that lawyers who encounter clients
who are resistant to moral counseling may disrespect clients' attempts to keep
121. Fried was disturbed that a lawyer "can win approval as a good, maybe even great lawyer even
though that loyalty is engrossed by ... distasteful clients." Id. at 1060.
122. See id. at 1078-79.
123. Fried's discussion concentrates on amoral clients. His minimal discussion of the fair client,
however, suggests that most often the lawyer will not need to change her own view. In his conclusion, he
notes that clients often are already moral subjects who know how to treat others fairly. See id. at 1088.
124. See id. at 1083 & n.35.
125. Fried explains that zealous advocacy "does not require us to assume that the law is hostile to the
client's rights." Id. at 1073. Rather, he explains, "[a]ll we need to assume is that even a system of law
which is perfectly sensitive to personal rights would not work fairly unless the client could claim a
professional's assistance. "Id. Fried's decision not to direct the lawyer-as-friend to pervert the legal rules
ensures that even if the lawyer is sympathetic to a client's cause, she cannot defy the substantive purpose
of the law.
126. Fried argues that an enlightened, socially responsible, utilitarian conception of client selection,
like the lawyer-as-statesman model, is unsatisfactory. See id. at 1060.
127. Fried also argues that the hired-gun model's propensity to allow lawyers to harm third parties is
unacceptable, and shows why his lawyer-as-friend model solves this problem in a more satisfactory manner.
See id. at 1064-65.
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their moral assessments private and suggests that they should deny these clients
representation.
C. The Lawyer-as-Hired-Gun
Dissatisfied with the lawyer-as-friend model's narrow potential for client
autonomy, I considered the hired-gun framework to guide my representation
of Ms. Scott. Initially, I believed that the model would allow Ms. Scott to act
autonomously. The classical hired-gun model suggested that I represent Ms.
Scott, regardless of her views. Indeed, under this model all clients are entitled
to representation in order to allow them to exercise their constitutional rights.
The classical hired-gun model also prohibited me from morally judging Ms.
Scott. To ensure that I did not judge her, I was instructed never to engage in
moral dialogue with her. In addition, once I began representing Ms. Scott, I
was forced to continue, even if I knew she was not considering the moral
repercussions of her behavior. For the hired gun "saves the client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons."'" She must
go on with the representation "reckless of consequences, though it be [her]
unhappy fate to involve [her] country in confusion."' 9
I noted two serious problems with the classical hired-gun model, however.
First, because the classical formulation of the model prohibited moral dialogue
altogether, it did not give the client true autonomy, since autonomous action
requires that one have the opportunity for reflective judgment.'3 Second, I
noted that most scholars had wholly rejected the classical version of the model
on the ground that, because it prevented moral dialogue, it promoted client and
lawyer amorality. Indeed, the contemporary description of the hired-gun model
remedied this problem. The contemporary reformulation posited that the lawyer
should select clients based on her own moral disposition, t3' should engage
in moral counseling of clients, 32 and could withdraw from representing
morally abhorrent clients.
33
The contemporary hired gun, however, takes away the client's autonomy
in the end.t34 Because the contemporary hired gun chooses clients based on
128. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., London. J. Robins & Co. Albion Press 1820-
1821).
129. Id.
130. Without a facilitator to help one engage in critical distinction-making. assessment, and judgment.
it is difficult for one to develop autonomous evaluation capacities. See KUPFER. supra note 33. at 45.
131. See Freedman, supra note 7, at 116-17.
132. Cf. Freedman, supra note 57, at 331 (urging lawyers to think of clients as people who need their
help).
133. See id. at 333. Freedman explains that if the client has made a material misreprscntation about
her situation, and the attorney would not have represented her if the truth had been known, the attorney
can terminate the relationship. See id.
134. Freedman changes the hired gun's modus operandi to:
[F]irst, help members of the public to be aware of their legal rights and of the availability of
legal services ... ; second, advise each client ... regarding the client's legal rights .. and
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her own moral code, clients who articulate an alien moral code could be
denied representation under the model. In addition, because the moral dialogue
in this model is based on the attorney's personal moral code,135 the model
thrusts the client into a hostile confrontation in which she must confront her
attorney's moral views. Although the contemporary hired-gun model allows the
client to make all moral decisions in the attorney-client relationship, I was
convinced that clients would be afraid to express their moral views freely,
anticipating that their attorneys might decline to represent them. Moreover, I
sensed that clients would be afraid not to acquiesce when their attorneys
offered unsolicited moral advice.
The coercive nature of the contemporary hired-gun model is directly
attributable to its use of ideology-of-domination constructs. Monroe Freedman,
the main proponent of the contemporary hired-gun model, argues that the
attorney has four discretionary moments: 36 (1) at intake; (2) with the client's
consent; (3) when withdrawal can be accomplished without significant harm
to the client; and (4) when the lawyer has been induced by the client to take
the case on the basis of material misrepresentations about the case.137
Because these discretionary moments allow the lawyer to sever her relationship
with the client when the lawyer is repulsed by moral dialogue with the client,
they tend to eviscerate Freedman's claim that the hired gun does not supplant
the client's power of moral decisionmaking. If the client dares to stake out a
moral position contrary to her lawyer's, she has no assurance that her attorney
will continue to represent her. 38
The client-as-threat construct is more subtly expressed under the
contemporary hired-gun model. The model suggests that a client who lives by
a moral code that seems alien to her attorney may be denied
representation. 39 In addition, if the attorney determines that the client is an
alien moral subject during her representation of the client, she may end the
relationship. The threat construct becomes clearer when one recalls how the
classical hired gun treated clients with unusual moral codes: by maintaining a
moral obligations; and third, zealously and competently use all lawful means to protect and
advance the client's lawful interests as the client determines those interests to be ....
Freedman, supra note 24, at 470 (emphasis added).
135. Freedman does not explicitly state that the lawyer must base her moral counseling on her own
moral code; nevertheless, it is an unstated premise in his discussions. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 57,
at 334-36; id. at 335 (arguing that lawyers "have a professional obligation to counsel (a] client to do what
[the lawyer] believe[s] is the right thing").
136. At first glance, the contemporary hired gun may seem to have only one discretionary moment-
at intake. Freedman argues that, "[u]ntil the lawyer-client relationship is contracted .... until, that is, the
lawyer induces another to rely upon his or her professional knowledge and skills-the lawyer ordinarily
acts entirely within the scope of his or her own autonomy." Id. at 332. He nonetheless mentions three
additional instances when the lawyer can resist a client's wishes. See id. at 332-33.
137. See id. at 332-33.
138. Freedman distinguishes his model from the attorney-as-friend model by arguing that unlike the
friend, the hired gun will not gently cajole a client into a course of action. She can merely highlight moral
concerns. See Freedman, supra note 24, at 471.
139. See Freedman, supra note 57, at 332.
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non-judgmental stance. In contrast, the contemporary hired-gun model advises
lawyers to handle unfavorable clients in much the same way as the other
models do: by ending the representation.'o
In both the contemporary and classical versions of the hired-gun model,
the attorney is a system protector. Her allegiance is to the adversary
system.'4' Freedman explains that "[t]he way in which [hired-gun] lawyers
recognize, honor, and enhance the rule of law in our society is by serving
individual clients. That is, . . . by enhancing the autonomy of each
individual."'' 42 Because the hired-gun lawyer's focus is on forcing the legal
system to engage disparate views, she will not take the time to ensure that the
client is fully aware of her motivations for seeking certain goals or the
repercussions of these motivations. Rather than making the client responsive
to the alien moral order represented by the law or making the law cognizant
of the client's contrary moral views, the hired gun simply keeps the adversarial
system functioning.
The hired-gun model is also hostile to other ethics models. Freedman
argues that the hired-gun role is derived from the Constitution itself;
consequently, he argues, it is the only way that the lawyer can uphold the
ideals of advocacy. 43 Advocates of the contemporary hired-gun model reject
alternative models on the ground that their intrusive versions of moral dialogue
inevitably lead to client domination." Still, since the hired-gun attorney uses
her own moral code to suggest moral considerations, she also runs the risk of
dominating her clients. Thus far, no hired-gun advocate has suggested changes
to the model that would prevent the lawyer from passing judgment on the
client for her moral views.
III. RECOGNIZING AND ESCAPING HEGEMONY
One indication of the hegemonic nature of the ideology of domination is
that the ideology entraps oppositional scholars as well as mainstream ethicists.
Oppositional scholars complain that the new models they create inevitably lead
to client subordination. In addition, oppositional ethics scholarship exhibits a
characteristic hesitance and tentativeness that is only partially attributable to
its postmodern commitments." 5 Some of this tentativeness is traceable to
140. See id.
141. See Freedman, supra note 24, at 469.
142. Id. at 471. Freedman cites a series of constitutional cases to support his view, including Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981); and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See
Freedman, supra note 24, at 468-69 & nn.7-8.
143. See Freedman, supra note 24, at 468-69.
144. See Freedman, supra note 57. at 334-36 (challenging such models as paternalistic and elitist).
145. See, e.g., LApez, supra note 20, at 1716 (describing progressives' commitment to the postmodern
view that knowledge comes from examining multiple. partial perspectives)-. White, supra note 23. at 854
(same).
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scholars' difficulties in getting beyond their conditioning under the ideology
of domination. This part examines signs that the ideology-of-domination
constructs are present in oppositional scholarship and shows how they limit
scholars' abilities to create models that facilitate client autonomy. Additionally,
this part notes instances in which scholars have escaped the ideology-of-
domination constructs. It concludes by offering scholars general strategies they
can adopt to avoid ideology-of-domination constructs in their work.
A. The Ideology of Domination in Oppositional Scholarship
Of all the ideology-of-domination constructs, oppositional scholars seem
least inclined to give up their use of the discretionary-moment construct.
Gerald L6pez, creator of the rebellious-lawyering model of ethics,'46 argues
that discretionary power gives a lawyer her sense of identity. 47  He
unabashedly rejects the idea that lawyers should "disavow their legitimate
claim on giving life to their convictions through their work, or deny the
inevitability of expressing their values through choices and judgments they
make in choosing and working with clients."' 48 He notes that progressives
who want lawyers to give up discretion are seen by their worst critics as
wanting to "level and neuter lawyers, leaving them without convictions and
commitments."' 49 Instead of trying to dismantle the construct, L6pez argues
that the lawyer can exercise discretion to determine a client's ends and goals
by having a sense of what the community's interests are. Unfortunately, L6pez
fails to a'ddress the fact that the lawyer's political commitments to the
community may lead her to subordinate individual clients' interests. Indeed,
the strategies the lawyer suggests will be based on her knowledge of the
limited portion of the community with which the lawyer is in dialogue.50
146. At present, the rebellious-lawyering model is the most popular oppositional ethics approach.
L6pez created the model in part because he recognized that progressive lawyes were struggling against
the regnant or traditional model of lawyering. See L6pez, supra note 20, at 1606, 1608. The regnant model
he describes encodes ideology-of-domination constructs. The rebellious-lawyering model posits that lawyer-
client relationships should be collaborative and nonhierarchical and that the lawyer shares the political
commitments of the community she serves. The rebellious lawyer uses a brand of political morality, derived
from discussions with community members. See id. at 1608, 1613 n.17.
147. See Lpez, supra note 73, at 318. CRT scholar David Wilkins, like Gerald L6pez, argues that
the lawyer should use her community allegiances to identify the moral values used in practice. See Wilkins,
supra note 3, at 1985 (arguing that black corporate lawyers have a responsibility to express their allegiance
to poor black communities when working with corporate clients). He believes that the profession ensores
its credibility by accepting moral responsibility for client actions. See Wilkins, supra note 61, at 473. This
perspective is markedly similar to Fried's traditionalist view. See Fried, supra note 1, at 1069-70.
148. L6pez, supra note 73, at 318.
149. Id.
150. See Tremblay, supra note 10, at 68 nn.184-85 (noting that there can be a conflict between an
individual poor client's goals and the long-term interests of poor communities). Indeed, this directive can
require the lawyer to pursue a variety of ends. See id. at 58, 59 (noting that L6pez's requirement that the
lawyer reflect the moral values of the community she serves could suggest helping poor persons facing
more powerful people or helping clients who reflect the community's needs).
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Notably, in some oppositional scholars' work, the discretionary moment
becomes part of the lawyer's desire to control client means rather than client
ends. Because oppositional scholars feel an affinity with poor communities and
focus on discussions of poverty lawyering in their work, they do not often
challenge lients' substantive goals. Oppositional scholars are attentive to, and
troubled by, their tendency to shape clients' means: namely, how much power
the client will have to tell her story.15' Oppositional scholars complain that
the default model of progressive lawyering entirely usurps discretionary power
from the client and gives the lawyer the power to determine what moral code
animates the client's story.'52 Although the oppositional scholars have tried
to find ways to help the lawyer translate her client's story so that she gives the
client more power, their discussions of power negotiation seem largely
reminiscent of traditionalists' discussions about how to negotiate power
relations in the attorney-client relationship. 53
The client-as-threat construct is also well entrenched in oppositional
scholars' work, although they are struggling against it. CLS advocate Peter
Margulies has described his frustration with his clinical students because they
often see their poor clients as threatening "Others."'5 L6pez notes that while
progressives claim that they are not repulsed by their clients, they usually
harbor closet fears of them.'55 To get beyond this mistaken perception, L6pez
encourages lawyers to develop ties with their clients' communities. 56 Other
scholars have pursued a less successful strategy: calling for increased lawyer
empathy.'57 Inevitably, however, there are limits to any' person's ability to
151. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L. 2567. 2567 (1993) [hereinafter
Alfieri, Impoverished Practices]; Anthony V. Alfieri. Stances, 77 CORNE.L L REV. 1233, 1233 (1992)
[hereinafter, Alfieri, Stances]
152. See Ltpez, supra note 20, at 1608.
153. Anthony Alfieri catalogues progressive scholars' attempts to address the lawyer's discretionary
power to tell the client's story. See Alfieri, Stances. supra note 151, at 1234-40. He surveys work in which
oppositional scholars describe lawyer "play," in which lawyers "shift(] the dominant-dependent hierarchy
of the lawyer-client relation ... to afford the client room to speak." Alfieri. supra note 32, at 2136-37.
Many progressive scholars attempting lawyer "play" end up dominating their clients. See Alfieri. Stances.
supra note 151, at 1235 (documenting one lawyer's failure at translation); Lucie E. White. Subordination.
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.. 38 BUF. L. REV. 1 (1990)
(discussing the author's failure to translate her client's story properly). These scholars' descriptions of play
and lawyer-client translation are simply a more poetic manner of discussing the attormey-client battle of
wills.
154. Margulies, supra note 22, at 695.
155. L6pez explains that oppositional scholars find it difficult to believe "in the ingrained virtue and
insight of all poor people-especially poor people of color." L6pez, supra note 73. at 317-18. lUpez
himself characterizes client contact as a "pain dragging" experience that can be "hard and sometimes
downright scary." Id. at 321.
156. See id. at 318-19. Charles Ogletree also argues that attorneys should become invested in the
communities they serve. See Ogletree, supra note 19. at 1291-92. Interestingly. a white middle-class student
attempting to implement Ogletree's advocacy model with his black impoverished clients rejected the model
because he found his clients' moral calculuses alien and self-defeating. See Robert Rader. Confessions of
Guilt. A Clinic Student's Reflections on Representing Indigent Criminal Defendants. I CUI~CAL L REv.
299 (1994).
157. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 22, at 68 n.25 (cataloguing feminist and CLS calls for empathy)-
Toni M. Massaro, Empathy Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words. Old Wounds. 87 Mtcn.
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empathize by imagining herself in the place of another. These limits would be
unproblematic in relationships in which parties have equal power and are
unafraid of one another.158 Lawyers, however, use their empathic sensibilities
to nullify clients' threatening natures. In this context, empathy has become a
tool of lawyer domination.' 59 The client is forced to become what the
attorney believes she must be, in order for the attorney to feel comfortable
representing her. Frustrated by their inability truly to understand their clients,
or repulsed by the imaginative project of getting to know "the Other,"'160
scholars are backing away from the empathy concept.' 61 Oppositional
scholars, however, need to consider whether the fear that inspires their empathy
is the problem, rather than assume that empathy is a means of domination.
Oppositional scholars have had the most success in moving beyond the
system-protector construct. When scholars fully reject the construct, the result
is transformative.1 62 L6pez was one of the first scholars to reject the system-
protector role. He argues that legal remedies are sometimes not enough 63
and that established legal structures are sometimes the problem.' 64 Armed
with these conclusions, L6pez expands the lawyer's role to include activities
whose aim is transforming the law. Under his model, the lawyer does work
traditionally considered the ambit of social workers, lobbyists, and community
organizers. 65
The call to ideological fidelity in the oppositional camp is less strong
because no oppositional model has become hegemonic. Oppositional scholars,
L. REV. 2099, 2106 (1989) (explaining that CLS and feminist scholars' failure to define empathy in their
work has led them to place unwarranted emphasis on the concept).
158. Toni Massaro argues that only after we are conscious of "the lines of our personal empathic
limitations may we develop more realistic ... proposals that better account for people's predisposition not
to see beyond their own concerns." Massaro, supra note 157, at 2123.
159. See Delgado, supra note 22, at 70. Delgado argues that "[r]eal empathy" is rarely required in
oppositional ethics models. Id. at 75. Instead, because many progressive lawyers see their clients'
experiences as radically alien, they inevitably employ a colonizing, imperial version of empathic relation.
Delgado warns that "[tihe most unsympathetic thing [white middle-class lawyers] can do is think [they]
have empathy with those of a radically different background. [They] can easily end up hurting [their
clients]." Id. at 72.
160. IUpez, supra note 73, at 319 (describing progressive scholars' resistance to emotional connection
with poor clients of color). The term "Other" is explained by Edward Said. See EDWARD W. SAID,
ORIENTALISM 325-26 (1978) (explaining how Western culture constructs persons of less favored race,
gender, and class status as foreign, threatening subjects).
161. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 32, at 2129 (describing the inherent limitations of empathic
connection and suggesting other strategies that can empower clients).
162. Not all scholars are convinced that lawyers can abandon this function. David Wilkins makes an
ambivalent argument for the construct, explaining that the legal system is not "entitled to survive regardless
of its social utility," although the lawyer must maintain her commitment to the law and help the client find
an established cause of action to address her injuries. Wilkins, supra note 61, at 468 n.2 1. Alfieri suggests
that lawyers view the system's codification of values "with suspicion." Alfieri, supra note 32, at 2134. It
is unclear, however, what a suspicious lawyer should do when the law harms her client.
163. See Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 (1989).
164. See id. at 9.
165. See id. (pointing out lawyers' multiple roles); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons on
Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699, 724 (describing the lawyer as a political
organizer).
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however, are beginning to develop tenets exclusive to the progressive model of
lawyering.' 66 The oppositional camp might in the end reject the ideological
fidelity construct because its projects are based on poststructuralist theory,
which suggests that any unitary, totalized vision of the world is dangerous and
constraining. 67 Still, oppositional scholars have not concentrated on the
identity-performance theories in poststructuralism and have been silent about
how calls to ideological fidelity animate individuals' identity-performance
drives. Indeed, oppositional scholars are increasingly adopting the second tenet
of ideological fidelity: A professional ethics model identity is a valid method
of expressing one's personal identity. t'6 They have not discussed how an
attorney's desire to act out her moral and political commitments in her
professional life can lead her to dominate clients. If oppositional scholars
continue to believe that lawyers can use clients in their identity projects, they
will inevitably come to believe that lawyers need a single identity or
professional paradigm around which to organize their identity performances.
Oppositional scholars' inattention to the limitations that the hegemonic
constructs impose on discussion stems in part from their failure to engage in
dialogue with traditionalists. 69 A heated exchange deconstructing the
dominant models might have revealed the operation of these constructs sooner.
Because oppositional scholars have failed to deconstruct the traditional ethics
models, many hegemonic constructs from traditional ethics approaches have
surfaced in their models. As Gramsci predicted, once hegemony takes hold in
oppositional thought, debate drifts to tangential issues.' Oppositional
scholars should consider whether their current debate about lawyer translation
of client stories and lawyer empathy can ever give birth to revolutionary
change.171 If these discussions are products of hegemony, the central tenets
of legal ethics that cause the domination of clients will go unexamined.
B. The Way Forward
Given the powerful hold the ideology of domination has on legal ethics,
autonomy-based critiques must, at a minimum, be highly suspicious of ethics
166. L6pez argues that he can distinguish between "those who are with us and those who are not."
L6pez, supra note 73, at 323. He posits that anyone who refuses to engage in community dialogue is not
a rebellious lawyer. See id.
167. See White, supra note 23, at 854.
168. See, e.g., David R. Esquivel, The Identity, Crisis in Public Interest Law. 46 DUKE U. 327. 330
(1996) (arguing against a hired-gun conception of lawyering because it does not give poverty lawyers
sufficient justifications for their work); Wilkins. supra note 3, at 2022 (arguing that his ethics model allows
"black corporate lawyers space to pursue their obligations to the black community free from professional
criticism").
169. Cf. Brown, supra note 22, at 530 (arguing that CRT accounts of racism vould be improved by
taking into account traditional scholarship on racism).
170. See THOMAS NEMETH, GRANiSCI'S PHILOSOPHY: A CRmCAL STUDY 17 (1980).
171. Cf. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, supra note 151, at 2694 (expressing ambivalence about the
success of lawyer translation); White, supra note 23, at 854.
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models that privilege the ideology-of-domination constructs. Scholars should
be wary of models that (1) privilege attorney discretion; (2) depict clients as
threats; (3) encourage the lawyer to act as a system protector; and (4) endorse
ideological fidelity. In addition, scholars should be leery of ethics models that
ask the lawyer to act out her identity by forcing a client to submit to a
predetermined moral code.172 Unless scholars are vigilant about these
constructs, they will be unable to theorize ethics models that promote client
autonomy. As a first step, scholars should find ways to create models that
avoid the constructs altogether. Ideally, however, they should analyze the
ideology-of-domination constructs to determine why these constructs have
persuasive power for traditional ethics scholars and for the majority of
lawyers. 73 Once we understand the reasons that these constructs are popular,
we can create new ethics models that address these issues without
subordinating clients. Our goal should be to address these concerns in a way
that allows attorneys to promote egalitarian social relations.
IV. THE ETHICAL MIRROR MODEL
To demonstrate how overcoming these constructs would allow us to create
a new affirmative vision of ethical lawyering, this part introduces the ethical
mirror model. The ethical mirror model is an ethics paradigm that is free of the
ideology-of-domination constructs. As the model moves beyond these
constructs, it transforms the attorney-client relationship into a space where a
client can learn how to engage in autonomous moral decisionmaking. The
ethical mirror model is intended to be a thought experiment that explores what
it would mean for lawyers truly to facilitate their clients' ability to engage in
autonomous moral decisionmaking. The model shows that lawyers can
participate in moral dialogue with clients without turning the interaction into
a coercive and judgmental experience.
A. Guiding Principles
The ethical mirror model is designed to serve one paramount goal: It
assists the client as she develops her capacity for autonomous moral judgment.
The model takes its definition of autonomous judgment from the Kupfer
definition described above. 74 Specifically, the model posits that the lawyer's
172. Catherine Hall warns that identity construction is often based on the idea that "I know who I am
[because] I know how and why I have power over you." Catherine Hall, Missionary Stories: Gender and
Ethnicity in England in the 1830s and 1840s, in CULTURAL STUDIES 240, 241 (Lawrence Grossberg et al.
eds., 1992).
173. Ideology does not wholly manufacture issues, but rather it translates amorphous concerns into
concrete problems. See EAGLETON, supra note 36, at 14-15. The ideology of domination simply articulates
lawyer concerns in ways that assist in maintaining our country's classist social order.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
[Vol. 107: 24732500
Legal Ethics
role is to assist clients in developing moral decisionmaking skills. The
cognitive skills the attorney helps the client develop include how to anticipate
the moral repercussions of her acts, how to discriminate between different
options based on their moral repercussions, and how to recognize and resolve
inconsistencies in her moral vision.
The model places attorneys in this role because legal education aptly
prepares lawyers to help others rationalize and instrumentalize amorphous and
sometimes conflicting values. 175 According to Austin Sarat and William
Felstiner, lawyers think about client motives in "rational-purposive terms,' 76
meaning that a lawyer can look at the client's articulated interests "in terms in
which technical rules and a problem solving orientation are more important
than [the client's] emotional reactions and justifications of self."'" This
orientation helps lawyers make sense of clients' moral goals without requiring
lawyers to agree with those goals on a personal or moral level. Additionally,
Sarat and Felstiner explain that lawyer-client interaction helps the client
develop her perspective of why others act in the world. "What lawyers tell
their clients about social relations, how they respond to client questions about
the motivations of other people, structures, at least in part, the way in which
clients "experience and perceive relations with others."'7 Therefore, the
lawyer is in a unique position to help the client create a moral universe: She
should empathize with, and assess the interests of, other players involved in
the client's legal claim.
The ethical mirror model imposes four requirements on the attorney. First,
the attorney must be willing to suspend her moral judgment of the client.
Second, she must enter into moral dialogue with the client. Third, she must be
able to don different ethical personae as the client demands changes in the
ethics approach used in the representation. Fourth, she must develop a facility
for explaining the ethics models and options to clients. If the attorney can
master these skills, she can help clients make informed and considered moral
choices. The requirement that the attorney be able to change ethics personae,
or "cycle" through ethics models, is perhaps the most difficult of all the
requirements. It is essential, however, that lawyers master this skill in order to
allow a client to change the ethical perspective used in her representation
without changing her attorney. This cycling process also helps the lawyer
maintain a distanced perspective from each ethics approach, giving her an
opportunity to see the strengths and weaknesses of each ethics model.
175. Law school teaches one how to analogize between different scenarios, to ferret out flaws in
seemingly logical arguments, and to instrumentalize general values. Since legal education focuses more on
these issues, rather than on substantive issues in morality, a lawyer is better qualified to serve as a moral
facilitator than as a moral judge.
176. Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 15, at 405.
177. Id.
178. Id. (intemal quotation marks omitted).
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The basic rules of the model are as follows: At intake, the ethical mirror
model attorney asks the client whether she wants to use one of the traditional
ethics models or if she would like to use the ethical mirror model approach.
If the client chooses the ethical mirror model, the attorney asks the client to
outline a moral view to guide her case. The attorney then explains how the
client's moral vision provides rules for how the client will treat others. The
attorney formulates a legal strategy based on the client's chosen ethics
approach. The attorney informs the client that she can change the moral vision
that guides the case if she is troubled by the vision's repercussions.The client
is required to redescribe her ethical vision at major stages in the representation,
in order to identify and resolve any inconsistencies in her perspective. The
main goal in the attorney-client relationship is to ensure that the client becomes
accustomed to anticipating and addressing the moral repercussions of her
actions. '79
The ethical mirror model imposes requirements on clients as well. Clients
must agree to enter into moral dialogue with their attorneys. Additionally, they
must commit to developing cohesive moral personae. The model requires
clients to commit to moral dialogue because this is the only way their attorneys
can be sure that clients are engaging in reflective judgment. As Kupfer
explains, autonomous judgment occurs only after the individual has made
informed reflective choice. 80 The model requires that the client create a
consistent and cohesive moral persona because it is likely that, as clients
recognize that a given ethics persona has unpleasant or costly requirements,
they may be tempted to vacillate between models, using whichever ethics
persona best serves their instrumental goals at a given time.
The ethical mirror model is radically different from the prevailing ethics
models because it gives the client the power to control which ethics vision
guides her case. No matter which ethics model the client chooses, she has
exercised her right to determine the scope of the moral dialogue. The client
can decide whether she is best served by a discussion of the legal system's
values, her lawyer's values, or her own values. Regardless of her decision, the
client has an opportunity to work with a facilitator to assist her in seeing the
liabilities and benefits of her chosen moral calculus.
B. Escaping the Ideology of Domination
The ethical mirror model radically restructures the attorney-client
relationship because it stakes out a position in opposition to the ideology-of-
domination constructs. First, the model changes the discretionary moment from
179. See infra Section IV.D for a more detailed discussion of the ethical mirror model in the context
of different types of practice.
180. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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a moment in which the lawyer examines her chosen moral code into a moment
in which the client discusses her independently constituted moral ideas. The
ethical mirror model also subverts the client-as-threat construct. The attorney
never feels as though her moral code is being challenged because she is not
required to use her moral dispositions to regulate her practice. In addition, the
model enables the lawyer to listen to, and not to feel threatened by, alien moral
codes because the attorney has worked under a variety of ethics models.
Finally, the lawyer's moral code is likely to be enriched because her
discussions with clients continuously give her fresh insights about morality.
The ethical mirror model also challenges the system-protector construct.
The model rejects the notion that the law enacts a correct moral code and
posits that the client is the person who establishes what justice is. Under this
model, the law is simply a means for the client to achieve her just ends. The
attorney, therefore, is an agitator who aggressively works with her client to
shape the law. Under this model, the attorney is more inclined to exploit
procedural protections, to stretch causes of action to address harms that the
legislature has not anticipated, and to bring cases testing the constitutionality
of laws that burden her clients' interests. In addition, the model advises the
lawyer to help clients who are not interested in aggressive legal strategies'
find other means of changing the law.5 2
The ethical mirror model also avoids the dangers of ideological fidelity.
The model rejects the idea that one perspective can give an attorney all the
insights needed to represent a client. The ethical mirror model requires that the
attorney cycle through different ethics models at her clients' request, making
attorneys more resistant to ideological conditioning. In addition, the attorney's
cycling through the various models prevents her from using her practice to act
out her moral identity. The lawyer will find that she cannot engage in a static
set of repetitive identity-performance practices. These practices may be
essential for identity construction; one must remember, however, that they can
easily lead to the subordination of others.
The ethical mirror model also capitalizes on the poststructuralist insights
that have informed oppositional ethics scholarship. The model is based on the
181. Admittedly, the strategies enumerated above reflect an idealistic notion of advocacy The attorney
may not have the resources to adopt aggressive strategies in every case. She is also required to tell the
client that the legal system will often ignore the pleas of people who try to challenge a law Most
importantly, the client may decide that she does not have the emotional stamina, time. or resources to
launch a frontal attack on the legal rules. Since the ethical mirror model is premised on the idea of client
autonomy, the attorney should defer to the client's decision about whether to engage in an aggremsive or
conservative legal strategy.
182. When the client requests a conservative case strategy, the attorney still na) connect her client
with grassroots lobbying organizations and impact litigation groups. Cf. LUpez. supra note 20. at 1610
(criticizing regnant or traditional models of lawyering for fatling to make connections with grassroots
organizations). These groups can help clients find ways to transform hostility toward the law into strategies
that pose less personal risk and, because the groups have few procedural rules, clients can express their
experiences more authentically than in traditional litigation contexts.
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idea that theoretical perspectives are partial" 3 and therefore must be
regenerative's to allow persons silenced by a theory to collaborate
periodically in its reformulation. The model instrumentalizes these insights. For
example, because the attorney uses different ethics models each day, the model
makes the lawyer recognize that her perspective is always partial. Moreover,
because the different models allow an attorney to experience conflicting moral
visions, the attorney has a broader and more nuanced understanding of the
moral universe than she would under a single ethics model. Finally, by making
lawyers assist clients in creating their own moral visions, the ethical mirror
model ensures that the attorney will be exposed to the regenerative influence
of disempowered persons.
C. Criticisms of the Model
Some might argue that the ethical mirror model is overly optimistic about
clients' abilities to engage in autonomous moral judgment, particularly in its
assumption that clients will have empathy for others. The ethical mirror model,
however, promises to cultivate clients' capacities for empathy by requiring
attorneys to remind clients continuously of how acts have material
repercussions for others. Even clients with strongly antisocial and misanthropic
moral views are likely to be susceptible to the model's influence. Requiring a
person to examine fully the inconsistencies in, and repercussions of, her moral
code may be more persuasive than forcing her to listen to the often pedantic
unsolicited preaching of an attorney.
The ethical mirror model may be difficult for lawyers to implement. A
lawyer may find that her client impetuously demands that she change models
without fully recognizing the import of her decision. Some confused clients
may simply want to experience each of the various ethics models. Others may
simply jump ship from a model when they realize that it will not allow them
to act as they originally desired. 85 In many cases, these problems will stem
from the lawyer's failure to explain the models adequately to her clients. When
the lawyer believes she has a client who is strategically changing ethics views,
however, she can increase the costs of changing models.
86
183. See, e.g., id. at 1716 (describing the commitment in the new advocacy literature to the slow
learning that comes from multiple, partial perspectives); White, supra note 23, at 854 (same).
184. See LUpez, supra note 20, at 1606, 1716 (arguing that lawyers, like all people, have incomplete
partial knowledge, and that they must "collaborate," "resolve," and "accommodate" differences in
perspectives in an "open ended interaction" to gain new insights); cf. White, supra note 23, at 855
(describing theory as an ongoing practice of reflection and conversation).
185. Thanks to Professor Dennis Curtis for pushing me on this point.
186. An attorney can either require the client to be bound by a given moral framework for a set time
period or require the client to engage in extensive dialogue about the client's decision before the lawyer
shifts models.
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Critics may also charge that the ethical mirror model is a form of
domination because it allows the attorney to bring a false coherence to a
client's often contradictory moral goals." 7 The attorney, however, makes the
client responsible for building a cohesive vision. Her only role is to point out
the client's inconsistent statements and to ask her to clarify her position. If the
attorney is unable to give true expression to the client's moral view, the client
can always direct the attorney back to another model of representation,
including a lawyer-as-statesman, lawyer-as-friend, or hired-gun approach.
D. The Ethical Mirror Model in Action
1. Poverty Law Practice
Ama Scott walks into my office. I ask her what she wants. She wants her
son back. I ask her whether she believes her cause is just and, if so, to explain
why. Specifically, I invite her to define her moral universe and to explain the
case to me in terms of her ethical vision. I explain to her that if she is
uncomfortable with this kind of moral dialogue, there are other approaches we
can use. I explain to her that I could act as a lawyer-as-statesman and counsel
her about the morality under the law. Or, I could act as a lawyer-as-friend and
counsel her based on my own moral code. Finally, I could act as a hired gun,
which would require me to give her my moral insights in a less aggressive
fashion. Ms. Scott chooses to use a mode of representation that employs her
own independently constituted moral view. I remind her that she can change
the moral code we use at any time during the representation.
Ms. Scott explains that, from her perspective, she represents the cause of
justice. She believes that she has been victimized three times. First, she was
brutally beaten by her child's father. Second, she was branded a suspect
mother by the hospital workers from whom she asked for help. Third, her
treatment plan imposed paradoxical requirements: Leave Hayden's father, but
maintain stable housing; finish a drug treatment plan, despite the fact that none
will admit someone who appears to have mental health problems.'" In her
mind, it was cruel to make the treatment plan her sole source of services when
it was also the mechanism that recorded her troubles as grounds for the state
to keep Hayden.
I ask Ms. Scott if her experiences have taught her any moral principles that
she wants to use in her representation. Ms. Scott explains that her experiences
187. I thank Professor David Wilkins for offenng this counterargument.
188. Ms. Scott's DCF case file indicated that she was "mentally fragile." but it made no special
provisions for mental health treatment. Over the course of my representation of her, several drug treatment
programs expelled her because they perceived that she was mentally ill. For a discussion of tlus problem.
see Christina Victoria Tusan, Homeless Families from 1980-1996: Casualties of Declining Support for the
War on Poverty, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1224-25 (1997).
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have led her to believe that the state has betrayed her. In her mind, the State
of Connecticut broke its promise to her. She was told that the state would try
to keep her with her son and help her to be a better mother. She feels that the
state then decided she was beyond help and decided to throw her away. She
feels her position is right because the state has broken its word.
I explain to Ms. Scott that under the ethical mirror model, I am a tool that
will allow her to act in the legal system. My only requirement is that she
engage in moral dialogue with me to ensure that she recognizes the ethical
repercussions of her actions. I explain that her moral vision will determine
what goals we set and how we present her story to the court. I remind her that,
before we pursue any major course of action, we will talk about the moral
effects of our strategy in order to determine if she is using a consistent,
reflective moral view.
I brief Ms. Scott about how her chosen moral view will affect others. Her
vision requires that we exploit every legal right she has in order to hold onto
her son. We will do everything in our power to force the state to live up to its
stated goal of reforming her as a parent. We will end the representation when
Hayden is in a place that addresses both her needs and his. I point out to Ms.
Scott that Hayden may be injured by our choices. We may prevent him from
being adopted by a foster mother to whom he has strong emotional ties. I also
note that our strategy will cause the foster family pain. Ms. Scott says that she
is comfortable with the moral repercussions of her acts. We spend the
remainder of our meeting turning her moral strategy into a legal strategy.'89
At the close of our meeting, I remind Ms. Scott that if she becomes
uncomfortable with how our actions affect others, we can change the moral
view guiding the representation or use her moral map to develop less
aggressive ways to achieve our goals. I explain to her that at each pivotal step
in the representation, I will ask her to outline her moral vision to ensure that
she uses a consistent moral approach. I reassure her that I will continue
representing her until her goals are met, I am taken off the case, or she stops
contacting me. I also brief her about ways she can work to change the child
protection laws, namely by participating in legislative advocacy groups.
2. Institutional Clients
The ethical mirror model is designed to address the needs of poor
individual clients. It can also be used, however, to represent corporate
entities. 19° Admittedly, it may be difficult to get a group of officers and
189. An attorney may also discuss how a client's choices will affect the legal system. Because Ms.
Scott felt the state had betrayed her, however, it seemed inappropriate to voice this concern.
190. Fried explains that models based on single-person representation can be extended to understand
corporate clients. In his view, "corporations and other institutions are only formal arrangements of real
persons pursuing their real interests. If the law entitles real persons to pursue their interests in these
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board members to agree on a single ethics vision. 9 Business ethics scholars
suggest that the attorney look to internal compliance codes,9 2 the corporate
charter, 93 or executive officer oaths' 9 to identify the moral rules that bind
the corporate officers in a common vision. While some may argue that these
materials insufficiently represent the interests of shareholders and other persons
with an interest in the corporation, 95 "informal consent to these rules can be
assumed to the degree that such values are selected, published and adhered to
by successive layers of the corporation."'9 If persons with an interest in the
corporation object to these moral guidelines, they have ample opportunity to
respond to and challenge these strictures.
A corporation that uses counsel employing the ethical mirror model will
enjoy numerous benefits. The model can help officers avoid liability, since
they may more often act in good faith because their counsel will force them
to reflect on the moral repercussions of their actions. In addition, participation
in moral dialogue may foster in officers an increased sense of corporate
responsibility. Lastly, a corporation with a mature, developed moral code will
enjoy increased stature in the eyes of government and the public.' 97
V. CONCLUSION
Ideology-of-domination constructs dominate traditional scholars' work. As
a result, scholarly debate focuses on the possibility that clients will pose threats
to the moral and legal order, rather than on examining how clients'
perspectives might enrich our collective understanding of morality.'"
Gramsci explains that progressive theorists must deconstruct old philosophical
complex forms, then why are they not entitled to loyal legal assistance ....'" Fried, supra note 1. at 1076.
Additionally, I would add, if these groups are allowed to act autonomously. they should be required to
articulate a cohesive moral vision as well.
191. But see E. Michelle Rabouin, Walking the Talk: Transforming lzn Students into Ethical
Transactional Lawyers, 9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. I, 3 (1996). Some scholars argue that businesses themselves
are looking to attorneys for ethical guidance, claiming that the notion that the firm is simply an organization
created to serve profit interests of shareholders without breaking the law has become passt. See id. at 29.
192. See, e.g., Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing Corporate Crime Data: The Dilemma
ofInternal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. I. 1-2 (1997) (discussing the costs and benefits of
internal compliance programs).
193. See Rabouin, supra note 191, at 30.
194. See id.
195. But see id. at 26 (arguing that corporations contain several constituencies, including corporate
officers and stakeholders).
196. Id.
197. Since many of the corporate codes and internal compliance materials are subject to public review.
companies already have a vested interest in ensuring that their moral statements of purpose will withstand
scrutiny.
198. A great number of ethics discussions simply address which of the dominant ethics models is the
best. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute
Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1 (1992); John M.A. DiPippa. Jacob's Blessing: A Review of Shaffer and
Cochran's Model of Moral Counseling, 18 U. ARK. LrTLE ROCK LJ. 85 (1995). Sammons. supra note
16; Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., LawYers as Strangers and Friends: A Reply to Professor
Sammons, 18 U. ARK. LrrLE ROCK LJ. 69 (1995).
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systems and understand their political effects before they can move on to
creating new philosophical models.'99 He warns that even seemingly
apolitical traditional theory can have political effects.2" This discussion
demonstrates that Gramsci's insight is true of ethics discussions as well. The
next generation of ethics scholars must be careful to look back on and
deconstruct the traditionai ethics models before they move forward. Otherwise,
seemingly innocent naturalized ways of viewing the world will infect their
work, and they will find that the problem of client domination persists. The
ethical mirror model offers scholars a vivid description of what lawyering
might look like if we move beyond ideology-of-domination constructs. This
model offers one possible way to affirm client autonomy in lawyering. As
scholars identify other ideological constructs in the traditional models, they can
create new ethics models that facilitate client autonomy in other ways.20'
Although the ideology of domination has been a formidable barrier, one that
has prevented us from exploring the full range of lawyering possibilities, we
have both the tools and the obligation to ensure that it does not become a
permanent cognitive barrier.
199. See NEMETrH, supra note 170, at 15 (summarizing Gramsci's views).
200. See id. The political effect of traditional ethics scholarship is that the seemingly innocent directive
allowing lawyers to import their moral codes into client representation ends up disempowering persons from
groups that are not well represented in the lawyering field.
201. But see Tremblay, supra note 10, at 42 (arguing that any of the activist moral stances suggested
to lawyers will tend to interfere with clients' instrumental legal goals).
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